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How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework 
GREGORY C. SHAFFER 
 
Much legal scholarship addresses law in terms of norms and 
incentives that affect business and individual behavior.  This Article 
addresses the mechanisms through which business shapes law.  There are 
two main ways in which business does so.  First, business influences the 
public institutions that make and apply law.  Second, business creates its 
own private legal systems, including private institutions to enforce 
privately-made law.  These two sources of law, publicly-made and 
privately-made, are interpenetrated; they reciprocally and dynamically 
affect each other.  This Article provides a socio-legal framework for 
analyzing business’s interactional relationship with law.  The Article 
argues that to assess the relation of business to law, we must look at three 
sets of institutional interactions: the interaction among public institutions 
(legislative, administrative, and judicial processes), in each of which 
business plays a critical role; the interaction of national and transnational 
institutional processes, with transnational processes having become more 
prominent; and the interaction among these public institutional processes 
and parallel private rule-making, administrative and dispute settlement 
mechanisms that business creates.  The dynamic, reciprocal interaction of 
public and private legal systems constitutes the legal field in which 
economic activity takes place. 
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How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework 
GREGORY C. SHAFFER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As part of their professional pedigree, lawyers are taught to view their 
discipline as autonomous.  Law has its specialized language—such as 
“consideration,” “tort,” “eminent domain,” and “mens rea.”  Law has its 
specialized mode of reasoning, in which student-apprentices learn to 
distinguish factual contexts, judicial dicta, and legal holdings to construct 
and parse rhetorical arguments and defend different angles of a question.  
And law has its perfomativity, whether in opening or closing arguments in 
a courtroom, the deposition of an opponent in a law office, or the 
interviewing of a client in which the lawyer hones toward the crux of a 
legal issue, disregarding events and feelings that have no legal 
implications.  Yet this view of law’s autonomy—the insider view—is 
narrow and naive to an outsider who views law’s performance from a 
sociological vantage.  Social forces give rise to law’s construction and they 
mediate law’s application which, in turn, shapes law’s reconstruction.  Law 
faces a dilemma regarding its legitimacy which gives rise to its Janus-faced 
nature, looking both inside and outside simultaneously.  Law’s legitimacy 
depends both on a perception of legal autonomy (an internal view of the 
consistency and coherence of applied legal concepts) and a perception of 
legal responsiveness (an external view of the social context in which law 
operates).  Without autonomy, law violates basic strictures of the “rule of 
law.”  Without responsiveness, law alienates its subjects. 
This Article puts business center stage as a means to understand law 
because business is a common feature of most areas of law,1 and because, 
as a consequence, business is central to law’s construction and reception.  
Moreover, the proliferation of privatized legal systems and international 
                                                                                                                          
* Melvin C. Steen Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School, and Fernand Braudel 
Senior Fellow, European University Institute (Florence).  I would like to thank the University of 
Minnesota Law School and the European University Institute for their research support; Fabrizio 
Cafaggi, Howard Erlanger, Tom Ginsburg, Claire Hill, Herbert Kritzer, Stewart Macaulay, Brett 
McDonnell, Randall Peerenboom, Joachim Savelsberg, Joanne Scott, Veronica Taylor, and the 
participants at a workshop at the European University Institute for their comments and suggestions; and 
Katie Staba, Carla Kupe, Kyle Shamberg, Ryan Griffin, Mary Rumsey, and Suzanne Thorpe for their 
research assistance.  All errors, of course, remain my own.  A separate version of this Article will 
appear in a chapter in The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government (David Coen, Wyn Grant, 
Graham Wilson, eds.) (forthcoming 2010). 
1 To name a few commonly taught subjects in law schools, these areas include contract law, tort 
law, commercial law, corporate law, antitrust law, labor and employment law, consumer law, 
environmental law, health law, insurance law, intellectual property law, administrative law, civil 
procedure, and constitutional law. 
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and transnational institutions challenge our very concept of law.2  We need 
a socio-legal analytic framework to understand the relationship of business 
(driven by a quest for profit) and law (characterized by both reason and 
coercion) to understand how law operates. 
There is a great deal of scholarship that addresses different aspects of 
the business-law relationship, from which this Article builds and to which 
it contributes.  We lack, however, an overarching socio-legal analytic 
framework to assess the dynamic interaction of public and private business 
lawmaking in different institutions at the national and international levels.  
Lon Fuller earlier put forward a general interactional theory of law.3  In 
Fuller’s words, law and society are linked in a mesh of “interactional 
expectancies.”4  With respect to statutory law: 
The interpretation of statutes is, then, not simply a process of 
drawing out of the statute what its maker put into it but is 
also in part, and in varying degrees, a process of adjusting the 
statute to the implicit demands and values of the society to 
which it is to be applied.5 
With regard to common law judging, as Gerald Postema writes in respect 
of Fuller’s theory: 
Through sensitivity to the underlying practices and 
understandings, and articulation of principled justifications 
for their decisions, courts sought to anticipate the ways in 
which ordinary citizens would take up their decisions, while 
the citizens were forced to understand the general import of 
the decisions in such a way as to anticipate how the courts 
would decide future cases as they may affect their lives.6 
Fuller, however, did not focus on business’s role, including its part in the 
creation of private legal systems. 
This Article applies an institution-centered analytic framework to 
                                                                                                                          
2 See Neil Walker, Out of Place and Out of Time: Law’s Fading Co-ordinates 23–26 (U. 
Edinburgh Sch. L., Working Paper Series No. 2009/01, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1367591, at 33–34 (“State law, including the frame of state constitutional law, is increasingly 
rivaled by law otherwise spatially extended, including sub-state law, regional supranational law, 
transnational domain-specific private ordering, hybrid public-private ordering, and, increasingly, new 
forms of global legal regime that neither claim universality nor obviously emanate from nor respect the 
aggregate sovereign will.”). 
3 Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JURIS. 1, passim (1969); see also 
Gerald Postema, Implicit Law and Principles of Legality, in LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY, PART ONE: THE COMMON LAW WORLD (forthcoming 2010) (citing LON L. FULLER, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER (Kenneth I. Winston ed., rev. ed. 
2001)). 
4 Fuller, Human Interaction, supra note 3, at 14; see also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF 
LAW 221–23 (2d ed. 1969). 
5 LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 59 (1968). 
6 Postema, supra note 3. 
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address the reciprocal interaction of business and law, maintaining that one 
cannot be understood without the other.  Law consists of systems of rules, 
standards, and procedures created and applied by social institutions which 
constitute business (by recognizing business charters) and which provide a 
framework in which business strategizes and operates.7  Business, in turn, 
uses law as a resource to advance and defend business aims, shaping law in 
various direct and indirect ways.8  While much legal scholarship addresses 
public and private legal ordering as distinct domains9 and assesses law in 
terms of norms and incentives that affect business and individual 
behavior,10 this Article reverses the telescope, providing a framework to 
assess the multiple mechanisms through which business reciprocally 
shapes law.  It applies this framework to empirical examples from an array 
of legal domains. 
To start with public institutions, business has advantages over other 
constituencies before them, be they legislatures, administrative bodies, or 
courts.  Each of these institutions may be more or less propitious for 
business at different times and in different contexts, and these institutions, 
in turn, can constrain, catalyze, and otherwise affect each other.  In 
addition, business creates its own private legal systems, including what is 
traditionally referred to as lex mercatoria (or private merchant law) and 
private institutions to enforce it (such as arbitral bodies).11  These two 
                                                                                                                          
7 On the growing pervasiveness of law during the latter half of the twentieth century, as reflected 
in more regulation, litigation, number of lawyers and other legal actors, and greater diffusion of 
information and public awareness about law, see Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legislation Around 
the North Atlantic, 55 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1992); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 6–9 (2002). 
8 By business, I refer to all institutional forms, including peak business trade associations, sectoral 
lobbying groups, large corporations, and small proprietorships.  Although the Article makes clear that 
the interests of business with regard to law are rarely, if ever, monolithic, it will at times focus on 
business as a whole in this Article to simplify analysis.  Corporate organization and state regulation 
have both grown dramatically in number and complexity over the last century, with each responding to 
the other.  On the rise and global diffusion of the corporate form, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER 
DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 144–45 (2000). 
9 See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 256–57 (1995) (discussing 
the legal process school and its heritage in the United States, which stresses how the state may adopt a 
“hands-off” strategy, leaving issues to “the process of private ordering,” and further noting that 
“efficient administration suggests the desirability of maximizing these elements” (citing HENRY M. 
HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 870–72 (1958))). 
10 Law and economics tends to focus on incentives and default rules, while legal philosophy tends 
to focus on law’s normative dimensions. 
11 By private legal systems and private law, I mean law made by and through private bodies, as 
opposed to traditional contract, property, and family law.  Cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Public and the 
Private in the Provision of Law for Global Transactions, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INSTITUTIONAL 
SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGES 239 (Volkmar Gessner ed., 2009) (focusing on the 
private production of law); Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State?  
Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 843–44 (2006) (providing 
conceptual clarifications of private law in light of processes of globalization and privatization); David 
V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 375 (2003) (distinguishing “private law” from 
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sources of law, publicly-made and privately-made, interact dynamically.  
Publicly-made law is made in response to developments in the private 
sphere, sometimes addressing privately-made law’s purported deficiencies, 
and sometimes codifying or otherwise taking into account private business 
law, business custom, and business institutional developments (such as 
alternative dispute resolution) into national statutes, regulations, and 
institutional practices.  Privately-made law is adopted in response to the 
public legal system, whether to preempt public law’s creation as 
unnecessary, to internalize public law through creating new organizational 
policies and procedures (affecting law’s meaning), or to exit from the 
public legal system through the development of alternative dispute 
resolution bodies.  The dynamic, reciprocal interaction of public and 
private legal systems at different levels of social organization constitutes 
the legal field in which economic activity takes place. 
To assess the relation of business to law, one must thus examine how 
law is created and applied through public institutions, how it is created and 
applied through private entities, and how these systems interact, including 
between the national and the transnational levels.  That is, one must look at 
three sets of institutional interactions: the interaction among public 
institutions (legislative, administrative, and judicial processes), in each of 
which business plays a critical role; the interaction of national and 
transnational institutional processes, with transnational processes having 
become more prominent in an economically globalized age; and the 
interaction among these public institutional processes and parallel private 
rule-making, administrative, and dispute settlement mechanisms that 
business creates, again at different levels of social organization.  This 
analytic framework for assessing the relation of business and law applies 
across legal subject areas. 
The remainder of this Article is in four parts.  Part II examines 
business’s role in shaping law through public institutions.  Part III assesses 
business’s creation of private legal rules and institutions.  Part IV analyzes 
how public and private legal systems interact, and, in particular, how 
private business-made law and business practice affect publicly-made law 
over time.  Part V addresses the interaction of business and law in the 
comparative and global context.  It shows how, on the one hand, much of 
international business law has developed in response to business demands 
and practices, in the process affecting national law.  On the other hand, it 
explains why national law and legal practice nonetheless retain significant 
variation in reflection of local interests, institutional structures, and 
business and legal cultures. 
                                                                                                                          
“privately made law”). 
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II.  BUSINESS AND THE PUBLIC LEGAL SYSTEM 
Business interests may be united or divided in relation to public 
institutions and the laws that these institutions create.  Regulation provides 
some businesses with competitive advantages over others, dividing 
business and creating incentives for different public-private alliances.12  
Business is divided on account of economic competition, and public actors 
are divided on account of political, ideological and administrative 
competition.13  Different factions within business thus ally with different 
factions within government.  Business interests, however, may also 
converge to oppose government measures, as when government sides with 
consumer or environmental groups at the national level, and business 
believes it will be disadvantaged against foreign competition.  With the rise 
of transnational institutions, businesses can also look to public actors at 
different levels of social organization to promote their interests. 
Business and law interact in mutually supportive and mutually 
constraining ways.  On the one hand, law can significantly constrain 
business choice so that business attempts to constrain law’s reach.  On the 
other hand, law not only helps to stabilize expectations and thus create 
greater business certainty, but it also provides legitimacy for business and 
business operations, shielding them from fundamental challenges,14 and it 
can provide competitive advantages for some businesses over others.15  
Business thus invests in law, both to shape law to support business 
interests and to legitimize business conduct, as well as to thwart law’s 
potential constraints. 
Business has a complex relationship with law, which, at a minimum, 
must appear autonomous from business or else law lacks legitimacy.  Yet 
as Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth write, “the autonomy of the law, which 
is necessary to its legitimacy, is not inconsistent with serving the needs of 
political and economic power.”16  There often exists an “unspoken 
                                                                                                                          
12 DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 1–3 (1995). 
13 The division of public actors, of course, depends on a non-autocratic system.  See, e.g., ROBERT 
A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 63, 78–81 (1956) (setting forth a pluralist theory of 
interest groups that distinguishes democracy, or polyarchy, from dictatorship). 
14 This is true not only of property and contract law, which facilitate and legitimize business 
economic activity, but also of regulatory law more broadly in a capitalist economy.  See, e.g., JAMES 
WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1780–1970, 60–61 (1970).  As Hurst wrote concerning developments of law affecting business 
in the United States, “[b]efore the late nineteenth century questions of legitimacy relating to the 
business corporation concerned in the main the legitimacy of the ends and means of government’s 
power as it affected corporations, rather than the legitimacy of corporations’ use of the facilities the law 
provided for them.”  Id. at 59.  While progressive regulation of corporations grew in the twentieth 
century, corporate law limits withdrew.  From the 1890s to 1930s, “[t]he function of corporation law 
[in the United States became] to enable businessmen to act, not to police their action.”  Id. at 70. 
15 VOGEL, supra note 12, at 1–3. 
16 YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
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deference of administrations, legislatures, and courts to the needs of 
business.”17  These processes of legitimation can go both ways.  Business 
also legitimates law through passive compliance and active support.  This 
phenomenon is particularly salient at the transnational level where public 
institutions are weak and may seek allies with business.  For example, 
rather than enacting binding legal norms, the United Nations, through its 
Global Compact, attempts to find partners within business to help to align 
business conduct with “universally accepted principles in the areas of 
human rights, labour, environment, and anti-corruption.”18  The Global 
Compact will only have relevance if businesses voluntarily agree to join it. 
A.  Business and Legislation 
Legislators may respond to business demands for many reasons, 
ranging from self-interest in campaign support, a desire not to harm 
business in light of business’s importance for the economy, and persuasion 
based on information that business provides.19  Organized businesses enjoy 
significant advantages in the legislative process over other constituencies 
because of their monetary and organizational resources, arguably 
facilitated in the United States by its traditionally pro-business ideological 
orientation.20  They can fund political campaigns, hire well-connected 
lobbyists, create think tanks to circulate business-friendly ideas, access the 
media, and promote the exchange of their personnel into government 
positions.  Because of these resources, organized businesses tend to have 
preferential access to the political process so that legislators take account 
of their views.21 
Business interests have long held a preferential position in lawmaking 
for structural reasons.  Their importance for investment and employment in 
capitalist economies provides them with a privileged position in dealings 
                                                                                                                          
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 98 (1996). 
17 CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL ECONOMIC 
SYSTEMS 179 (1977); see Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its 
Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1399–1401 (2006) (discussing how “[i]n the past thirty years the 
business corporation has achieved an ascendancy over government entities . . .”). 
18 United Nations, Overview of the UN Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/About 
TheGC/index.html (last visited June 2, 2009).  I thank Fabrizio Cafaggi for our discussion on this point. 
19 The extent to which they do so depends on “a large number of factors—among them the nature 
of the issue, the nature of the demand, the structure of political competition, and the distribution of 
resources . . . .”  KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 317 (1986); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND 
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 17–21 (1991) (discussing the complex and unpredictable 
relationship between interest groups and legislators). 
20 LINDBLOM, supra note 17, at 172, 174; Kevin Farnsworth & Chris Holden, The Business-Social 
Policy Nexus: Corporate Power and Corporate Inputs into Social Policy, 35 J. SOC. POL’Y 473, 475 
(2006). 
21 David Vogel, The Power of Business in America: A Re-Appraisal, 13 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 19, 29 
(1983); Farnsworth & Holden, supra note 20, at 475–76. 
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with government, since critical market functions such as jobs, prices, 
production, growth, standard of living, and economic security depend on 
business activity.22  Government thus has incentives to facilitate business 
performance by providing business with benefits, including tax breaks, 
subsidies, or business-favorable regulation.23  The globalization of 
production arguably “enhances the structural power of corporate capital” 
because business can threaten to invest elsewhere if national regulation is 
unfavorable.24  During financial crises, some businesses can be deemed too 
big and too important to fail.25 
Political representatives nonetheless respond to popular concerns 
regarding business power, the intensity of which varies over time.  In the 
United States, the regulatory state grew significantly during the New Deal 
in the 1930s, in response to the public interest movement of the 1970s, and 
may well do so in light of the global financial crisis that exploded in 2008.  
Yet when faced with potentially constraining regulation, business lobbying 
can produce compromises that safeguard business interests, such as the 
inclusion of exceptions, loopholes, and open-ended language subject to 
subsequent interpretation.  In some cases, “public interest” statutes may 
serve as a facade, providing a symbol of government concern while 
masking government inaction.26 
B.  Business and Administration 
Statutes often contain language that is sufficiently ambiguous so that 
their application depends on which parties mobilize the law to advance 
their ends before administrative agencies.  There is a large literature, 
including that of public choice in law-and-economics, debating whether 
agencies are “captured” or “co-opted” by special interests, and, in 
particular, business interests.27  While it is an overstatement to maintain 
                                                                                                                          
22 LINDBLOM, supra note 17, at 172. 
23 Id. at 174. 
24 DAVID HELD, ANTHONY MCGREW, DAVID GOLDBLATT & JONATHAN PERRATON, GLOBAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 270, 281 (1999); DANI RODRIK, HAS 
GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? 44–45 (1997). 
25 See, e.g., GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL:  THE HAZARDS OF BANK 
BAILOUTS 1 (2004) (“These banks have assumed the title of ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF), a term describing 
the receipt of discretionary government support by a bank’s uninsured creditors . . . .”); David Reiss, 
The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle 
Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1050 (2008) (“The term ‘Too Big to Fail’ refers to a 
policy where a government chooses to intervene in the market and bail out insolvent institutions instead 
of letting them unwind their affairs through normal channels, such as the bankruptcy courts.”); Edmund 
L. Andrews, Battles over Reform Plan Lie Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2009, at B1 (referring to 
companies as “too big to fail”); Thomas L. Friedman, The Price Is Not Right, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 
2009, at A31 (referring to companies as “too big to fail”). 
26 MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 150 (2d ed. 1985); MURRAY EDELMAN, 
POLITICS AS SYMBOLIC ACTION: MASS AROUSAL AND QUIESCENCE 36–38 (1971). 
27 Cf. ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL 
PROPOSALS 15 (1971) (finding that agencies sometimes choose to pursue other objectives at the 
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that business simply captures agencies,28 most agree that agencies are 
subject to significant business pressure and influence, and that business 
often occupies a privileged position.  Explanations for business’s influence 
range from sociological, with regulators learning to think like the regulated 
through constant interaction with them, to interest-based, where it is in the 
regulators’ interest to accommodate business to avoid adverse 
consequences, such as contestation before legislative committees and the 
courts.  Well-organized business groups can sometimes shape the 
application of regulation that is nominally designed to protect a public 
interest (e.g., clean air) to suit producer interests (e.g., the producers of 
“dirty coal”).29  Business groups can also press legislatures to thwart 
regulation that business does not favor, including through threats to limit 
agency funding for relevant programs.30  Administrative law ultimately can 
be viewed as a negotiated legal order in which public officials and private 
actors must coordinate if public goals are to be realized.31 
Representatives of organized interests are in constant contact with 
agency officials, and the two sides have opportunities to exercise influence 
over each other.  Regulatory officials deploy “soft” persuasive mechanisms 
and threaten “hard” enforcement to affect business conduct.32  
Reciprocally, even lower-level officials who see their specialized position 
as technocratic can have their views shaped over time through regular 
interaction with business representatives and the information that business 
provides.33 
A “revolving door” political culture also furthers business’s access to 
administrative lawmaking and application.  In the United States, business 
is often able to obtain the appointment of supportive political appointees to 
                                                                                                                          
expense of the public interest); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 
& MGMT. SCI. 335, 335–36 (1974) (asserting that regulations respond to the demands of interest 
groups). 
28 JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 359 (1980). 
29 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR HOW 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL 
PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 79 (1981) (showing how a business coalition 
successfully lobbied for regulatory change at the expense of the public interest). 
30 See CINDY SKRZYCKI, THE REGULATORS: ANONYMOUS POWER BROKERS IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 106–07 (2003) (stating that Congress withholds federal funding as a tactic to impede 
regulation); PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 176 (1981) 
(discussing pro-business budgetary incentives). 
31 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (2000). 
32 Keith Hawkins, Bargain and Bluff: Compliance Strategy and Deterrence in the Enforcement of 
Regulation, 5 LAW & POL’Y Q. 35, 40–41 (1983); Robert A. Kagan, Neil Gunningham & Dorothy 
Thornton, Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 51, 61–62 (2003); see IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:  
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 19 (1992). 
33 See Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: 
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 277–78 (2004) (stating 
that the best source of information for government regulators is from the very firms that they regulate). 
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lead governmental agencies.34  More generally, lawyers and lobbyists in 
Washington, D.C. enhance their resumes by splashing a few years in public 
life to subsequently—and lucratively—serve private commercial clients.  
As former United States Trade Representative Robert Strauss observed, 
lawyers often go to work for the U.S. Government because “they know that 
[government work] enables them to move on out in a few years and 
become associated with a lobbying or law firm [where] their services are in 
tremendous demand.”35  Whether or not regulators accommodate business 
to prop their own career prospects, a “revolving door” political culture 
forges understanding among public and private representatives so that each 
side better appreciates the other’s perspectives and needs. 
C.  Business and the Courts 
By initiating and defending cases, litigants shape the law’s  
application, interpretation, and elaboration over time.36  Even where a 
statute or administrative regulation does not favor business, business can 
attempt to mobilize litigation and dispute settlement resources to build 
favorable judicial precedent.  Just as in political and administrative 
processes, well-resourced actors have advantages.  To start, organized 
businesses benefit from economies of scale because of their experience 
with litigation.  They also tend to have greater financial resources, which 
they use to attract the best lawyers to gather evidence and put forward legal 
arguments.  Corporate in-house counsel can hire leading external law firms 
that employ scores of legal associates to scour statutes and jurisprudence 
and develop sophisticated factual and legal arguments.  As John Heinz and 
Edward Laummann showed, legal “fields serving big business clients” are 
at the top in ranking of prestige, and “those serving individual clients . . . at 
the bottom.”37  Corporate legal counsel can also deploy procedural 
                                                                                                                          
34 See SKRZYCKI, supra note 30, at 84 (discussing the industry background of the top appointees 
of the Labor Department’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration during the Clinton and 
George W. Bush administrations). 
35 Jill Abramson, The Business of Persuasion Thrives in Nation’s Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 
1998, at A1 (quoting Strauss). 
36 Donald J. Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 147 (1973); STUART A. 
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 4–5 
(1974).  Although this is clearly true in common law systems, it is also arguably the case in civil law 
systems where judges and legal scholars refer to judicial decisions as regarding the law’s meaning and 
give weight to them, which helps to preserve legal certainty and consistency.  See, e.g., Mauro 
Cappelletti, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Civil Law: A Fundamental Difference—Or No 
Difference at All?, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KONRAD ZWEIGERT ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG 388, 392 (Herbert 
Bernstein, Ulrich Drobnig & Hein Kötz eds., 1981) (“[T]here is no sharp cleavage between the two 
major legal traditions, not even to the topic [stare decisis] discussed in this article.”). 
37 JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF 
THE BAR 127 (1982).  Law firms have grown significantly in size, as have litigation expenses, favoring 
those with greater resources.  MARC GALANTER & TOM PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 4–5 (1991). 
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mechanisms to draw out litigation and impose costs on less-resourced 
parties to induce favorable settlements.  These advantages can be 
countered, in part, where mechanisms exist—such as attorney fee awards 
and class action lawsuits—which incentivize attorneys to bring lawsuits on 
behalf of consumers, investors, and other constituencies.38  Yet 
corporations’ resources and experience generally provide them with 
significant advantages over individuals. 
Moreover, business can attempt to use soft law processes, such as 
through the American Law Institute which compiles “restatements” of the 
existing state of law, where business has been less successful before 
legislatures.39  Similarly, business has funded research institutes, including 
some within law schools, which have challenged, directly or indirectly, the 
rationale for regulation.  To give an example, Henry Manne’s Law and 
Economics Center at George Mason University School of Law created a 
program for judges that was viewed by many as being pro-business and 
anti-regulation and which was dubbed by Arthur Leff as “Henry Manne’s 
summer indoctrination session.”40  A large percentage of the federal 
judiciary has attended it.41  In these ways, business aims to affect 
subsequent legal interpretation by courts over time. 
Marc Galanter has theorized the limited prospects of social change 
through adjudication in his classic work, Why the “Haves” Come Out 
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change.42  As Galanter states, 
certain actors are more likely to be “repeat players” in litigation.  These 
repeat players do not use the adjudicative process solely for the 
adjudication of single, unrelated cases; they also play for rules.  As repeat 
players, they are well-positioned to settle unfavorable cases and litigate 
and appeal cases that are more likely to result in a favorable legal 
precedent.  By selecting which cases to settle and thus extract them from 
                                                                                                                          
38 These attorneys also have their own interests, complicating the assessment of the costs and 
benefits of these mechanisms.  For an empirical assessment of the use of contingency fees, see Herbert 
M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. LAW Q. 739, 744–47 
(2002). 
39 See Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
743, 782, 784–85 (1993) (describing lobbying efforts by the ALI); see also Alex Elson, The Case for 
an In-Depth Study of the American Law Institute, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 625, 625 (1998) (noting the 
ALI’s general contributions to the development of the law).  David Snyder likewise notes how the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws also acts as a de facto private 
legislator.  Snyder, supra note 11, at 378–82. 
40 Arthur Allen Leff, Commentary, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 
60 VA. L. REV. 451, 452 (1974). 
41 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 360 (2001) (“[B]y 1983, over 
one-third of the federal judiciary had attended it at least once.”); see also Law and Economics Center, 
http://www.lawecon.org/about (last visited July 8, 2009) (noting attendance by “more than 5,000 
judges”). 
42 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 95 (1974) (maintaining that the legal system’s structure inhibits 
change). 
 2009] HOW BUSINESS SHAPES LAW 159 
the adjudicative process, repeat players are better positioned to reduce the 
likelihood of adverse precedent affecting their future operations.43  Even 
where subsequent legislation overturns a judicial precedent favorable to a 
repeat player, such new legislation triggers a new process of legal 
interpretation where well-resourced repeat players are favored. 
Galanter defines a repeat player as a “larger unit . . . which has had and 
anticipates repeated litigation, which has low stakes in the outcome of any 
one case, and which has the resources to pursue its long-run interests.”44  
He defines a “one-shotter,” in contrast, as a smaller unit whose stakes in a 
given case are high relative to the actor’s total worth.45  One-shotters, as a 
result, are more likely to focus on the particular result from settling a 
dispute rather than the creation of long-term precedent affecting future 
operations.  Galanter finds that “organizations roughly correspond to 
[repeat players],” whether the organizations be a business or government 
actor.46 
Catherine Albiston has examined how businesses have strategically 
used litigation to shape the interpretation of aspects of employment law 
over time.  Applying Galanter’s framework, she finds that “[e]mployers 
may settle strong cases likely to produce adverse decisions, ensuring that 
these cases never become the basis for a published judicial opinion[,]” 
while they “may dispose of weak cases . . . through motions to dismiss or 
motions for summary judgment, which often do become part of the judicial 
interpretation of the law.”47  She finds that “published judicial 
determinations of rights . . . occur primarily when employers win[,]”48 
which affects understandings of law in subsequent employment disputes.  
Employees’ successful settlements come “at the price of silence in the 
historical record of the common law.”49 
In the United States, businesses have successfully used litigation to be 
recognized as “persons” benefiting from constitutional rights, such as 
involving search and seizure, free speech, and campaign finance, as 
opposed to mere instruments of natural persons.  Carl Mayer characterized 
Supreme Court decisions recognizing constitutional rights protections for 
corporations against government action as symbolic of “the transformation 
of our constitutional system from one of individual freedoms to one of 
                                                                                                                          
43 See id. at 103 (describing how repeat players utilize experience to reach favorable litigation 
results). 
44 Id. at 97–98. 
45 See Marc Galanter, Afterword, Explaining Litigation, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 347, 347 (1975) 
(describing “one-shotters”). 
46 Id. at 348; see Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead, supra note 42, at 97, 113 
(discussing businesses and bureaucracies as repeat players). 
47 Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing by 
Winning, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 894 (1999). 
48 Id. at 902. 
49 Id. at 906. 
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organizational prerogatives.”50  In contrast, although there have been 
stirrings of some change, corporations have remained relatively “immune 
from criminal punishment” because criminal laws are typically designed in 
contemplation of natural persons.51 
D.  Negotiation in the Law’s Shadow 
Reading statutes, administrative regulations, and judicial decisions tells 
us little about the law’s operation.  As socio-legal scholars have long 
shown, there is a difference between the law in the books (whether in 
statutes or published judicial decisions) and the law in practice, what they 
refer to as the “gap.”52  Only a few disputes are fully litigated.  Most are 
settled through negotiation.  As Galanter reminds us, “the career of most 
cases does not lead to full-blown trial and adjudication but consists of 
negotiation and maneuver in the strategic pursuit of settlement through 
mobilization of the court process.”53  Galanter calls this process 
“litigotiation.”54 
Two primary aspects of the law exercise shadow effects on bargaining: 
the law’s substance and the law’s procedures.  The substance of law, as set 
forth in statutes and administrative regulations and as interpreted in case 
law, can inform and constrain settlement negotiations conducted in the 
law’s shadow.  As Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser observe in their 
famous study of divorce law, “the outcome that the law will impose if no 
agreement is reached gives each [party] certain bargaining chips—an 
endowment of sorts.”55  Those more legally astute are more likely to be 
aware of the bargaining chips that they may deploy in order to use them 
strategically to their advantage.  Repeat players in dispute settlement who 
can “play for rules” may also affect the very nature of the bargaining chips. 
The judicial decision itself may be viewed in terms of its “shadow 
effect” on the resolution of a dispute.  Negotiations may take place in the 
                                                                                                                          
50 Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS 
L.J. 577, 578 (1990). 
51 Marc Galanter, Comment, Farther Along, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1113, 1118 (1999). 
52 See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 22 (1979) (demonstrating the gap between law “on the books” and its 
implementation in criminal justice system); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: 
A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 56 (1963) (documenting differences between written 
contracts and actual practices followed by parties); Robin Stryker, Mind the Gap: Law, Institutional 
Analysis and Socioeconomics, 1 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 335, 358–59 (2003) (concluding with a discussion 
of institutions generally). 
53 Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to Know 
About Contract Litigation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 577, 596 (2001). 
54 Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach about Legal Process, 34 J. LEG. 
EDUC. 268, 268 (1984). 
55 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979).  But see Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 
supra note 52, at 63–64 (regarding the role of non-legal norms in the settlement of business disputes). 
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context of, and be informed by, a judicial decision.  As Stewart Macaulay 
writes regarding contract law, “[w]hat appears to be a final judgment at the 
trial level may be only a step toward settlement.  The judgment may affect 
the balance of power between the parties, but often it will not go into effect 
as written.”56  Parties can settle the dispute in the shadow of a potential 
appeal, or they can settle it in light of their ongoing business relations with 
each other and third parties. 
In addition, the law’s “shadow” effects include the costs of deploying 
the law procedurally.  As Herbert Kritzer states, “the ability to impose 
costs on the [opponent] . . . and the . . . capacities for absorbing costs” 
affect how the law operates.57  Where large businesses can absorb high 
litigation costs by dragging out a case, while imposing them on weaker 
complainants, they can seriously constrain a person’s incentives to initiate 
a claim, and correspondingly enhance a person’s incentives to settle a 
dispute unfavorably.58  Law casts a weaker shadow for parties that lack the 
ability to hire and retain skilled lawyers, unless there are mechanisms, such 
as attorney fee awards and class actions, which create incentives for the 
plaintiff’s bar.  When legal resources cannot be mobilized cost-effectively, 
then a party’s threat to invoke legal procedures against a business that 
wields greater legal resources has less credibility.  A party may not even 
consider the threat of litigation, knowing the challenges that it faces.  It has 
less of an incentive to become aware of the state of the law, affecting what 
is called in socio-legal studies its “legal consciousness.”59  These aspects of 
the legal system most adversely affect individuals with fewer resources. 
In sum, businesses have advantages in each of the public institutions 
discussed above and can look for allies in each of them when their interests 
are at stake.  At times, businesses may find the legislature more favorable 
to their views, at others the executive, and at others courts.  Businesses can 
thus search for allies in one public institution to counter or constrain 
another, as will any organized constituency.  These institutional processes 
                                                                                                                          
56 Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, 
Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MOD. L. REV. 44, 71 (2003). 
57 HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN 
ORDINARY LITIGATION 73 (1991). 
58 See David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.R. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel B. 
Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 76 (1983) (considering litigation 
from an investment standpoint). 
59 See, e.g., David M. Engel, Globalization and the Decline of Legal Consciousness: Torts, 
Ghosts, and Karma in Thailand, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 469, 471 n.2 (2005) (“Legal consciousness in 
this article refers to the practices and concepts invoked by ordinary people who have suffered injuries 
and who, in the course of their subsequent narrations, discuss questions of remedy, fate, causation, and 
justice.”); Elizabeth A. Hoffmann, Legal Consciousness and Dispute Resolution: Different Disputing 
Behavior at Two Similar Taxicab Companies, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 691, 692–93 (2003) (“Scholars 
have defined legal consciousness as how people make sense of law and legal institutions and how 
people give meaning to their law-related experiences and actions.”); see also Charles Cortese, A Study 
in Knowledge and Attitudes Toward the Law: The Legal Knowledge Inventory, 3 ROCKY MTN. SOC. 
SCI. J. 192, 192–93 (1966) (discussing inadequate experience with and ignorance of the law). 
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interact over time, giving rise to the national public law system.  This 
public law system, however, is not autonomous, but is affected by 
developments in the private sphere. 
III.  THE PRIVATE LEGAL SPHERE 
Law-in-action refers to how law is received, interpreted by and 
subsequently given meaning through practice—what Eugen Ehrlich called 
“the living law.”60  Publicly-made law, whether formed through statute, 
administrative regulation or judicial judgment, not only must be put into 
action through practice; it also complements, competes and interacts with 
private ordering mechanisms, affecting public law’s meaning and 
application.  To understand the relation of business and law, one must 
examine both how business responds to publicly-made law (which we 
explore in this section) and how that response can feed back into publicly-
made law (which we examine in Part IV). 
A.  Alternative Choices for Privately-Made Law 
We can view business’s response to publicly-made law in terms of 
three broad approaches.  First, businesses can create their own private legal 
ordering regimes, which, if accepted as legitimate, can displace the 
demand for publicly-made law.  This approach involves a privately-made 
alternative that is relatively centralized.  Second, businesses can ignore 
existing public law, even that in their favor, because of other concerns such 
as long-term client relations and reputation.  This market-oriented 
alternative, in which business focuses on partner and customer relations 
and social norms, is decentralized.  Third, businesses can implement public 
law requirements through internal organizational policies and procedures 
in which they translate and potentially transform the meaning of publicly-
made law.  This internal organizational business alternative, in turn, may 
be diffused through customary business practice to entire business sectors 
and thus lies between the first two alternatives.  Through these 
mechanisms, the corporate organization can act, “to varying extents, as a 
legislator, adjudicator, lawyer, and constable,” and thereby constitute a 
private legal system.61 
                                                                                                                          
60 EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 501–02 (Walter L. 
Moll trans., 1936). 
61 Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on the 
Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 941, 961 (1999); Stewart Macaulay, 
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emergence of private policing.”  LAUREN B. EDELMAN & MARK C. SUCHMAN, THE LEGAL LIVES OF 
 
 2009] HOW BUSINESS SHAPES LAW 163 
Business has long created its own private legal systems, in particular to 
govern commercial transactions under merchant law (or lex mercatoria).62  
These private business law regimes can be national or transnational in 
scope.  At the national level, businesses have created standardized 
contracts which effectively have become the law for sectors of industry, as 
has been the case with the standards set by the American Institute of 
Architects for the design and construction of buildings.63  Similarly, stock 
exchanges began as relatively autonomous private organizations.64  For the 
insurance sector, Lloyd’s of London syndicates were effectively 
responsible for insurance law in the United Kingdom, and Lloyd’s power 
extended internationally because London was the financial center for 
international trade.65  Today, the credit card industry effectively sets credit 
card rules for consumers and businesses on many issues.66  Business self-
regulation plays a central role in international harmonization as well, as 
this Article explores further in Part IV.  Through business’s creation of 
new institutions, such as through chambers of commerce and trade 
associations, this alternative is the most centralized of the privately-made 
variants. 
Second, a business can simply disregard law in light of long-term 
client relations and reputational concerns.  As Macaulay found in his 
famous study of business contracts and the settlement of business disputes, 
“[t]here is a hesitancy to speak of legal rights or to threaten to sue in these 
negotiations.”67  Ian Macneil elaborated these insights in developing 
“relational contact” theory which postulates that social norms underpin 
contractual relations so that individual contracts and contract disputes are 
best viewed as “part of a relational web.”68  As Macaulay and Macneil 
show, a business may not even engage with law to determine what legal 
rights, claims, or defenses it may have.  Non-legal sanctions, such as 
damaged reputation, are available if a business does not act in good faith.  
This alternative which relies on business relations and social norms is the 
                                                                                                                          
PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS xxv (2007).  On the latter point, businesses use private police forces to patrol 
their premises and oversee their workforce.  It is estimated that private police outnumber public police 
by 3:1.  Edelman & Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court, supra, at 958. 
62 LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 1–3 (1983). 
63 Macaulay, Private Government, supra note 61, at 448; W. David Slawson, Standard Form 
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529–30 (1971). 
64 Snyder, supra note 11, at 385–86 (describing the stock exchanges as private legislators). 
65 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 113. 
66 Snyder, supra note 11, at 398–402. 
67 Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, supra note 52, at 61.  See Lisa Bernstein, 
Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992) (“The diamond industry has systematically rejected state-created law.  In 
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68 IAN MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 
18 (2001). 
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most decentralized; law (in terms of formal rules, standards and 
procedures) plays the most limited role. 
Third, business responds to publicly-made law by creating internal 
corporate organizational policies and procedures which parallel and 
overlap with public law.  Like the external public legal system, 
organizations adopt increasingly detailed rules, policies, and programs, and 
create new departments and positions to oversee regulatory compliance.  In 
some cases, these new programs and institutions can facilitate other 
parties’ awareness and activation of the law.  In other areas, they can lead 
to interpretations and applications of law that neutralize the law’s 
normative ambitions.  In short, business internalization processes can 
either expand or weaken the law’s reach. 
B.  The Impact of Corporate Internal Policies: Expanding and Curtailing 
Law’s Reach 
1.  Expanding Law’s Reach 
By internalizing public law norms and principles, business can further 
public law’s reach.  In some cases, businesses may instrumentally do so, 
marketing themselves as good citizens which protect the environment and 
labor rights.69  Businesses may even require their suppliers to conform to 
these policies, extending their effects.  In other cases, the process may be 
less consciously instrumental. 
Corporate internalization policies provide a particular form of 
legalization.  Phillip Selznick and Philippe Nonet went so far as to argue 
that such legalization transforms business organizations into polities that 
provide citizenship rights for their constituencies.70  Public law, for 
example, spurs the creation of internal corporate rules and, in doing so, can 
expand the “rights consciousness” of particular constituencies, such as 
employees, reinforcing their expectations of social justice.71  Public law, in 
parallel, can spur the creation of new corporate compliance personnel 
                                                                                                                          
69 See ASEEM PRAKASH, GREENING THE FIRM: THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE 
ENVIRONMENTALISM 147 (2000) (discussing the adoption of environmental policies by private firms); 
ASEEM PRAKASH & MATHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: GREEN CLUBS, ISO 
14001, AND VOLUNTARY REGULATIONS 2 (2006) (describing voluntary adoption of regulatory systems 
by businesses and industries). 
70 PHILIP SELZNICK, PHILIPPE NONET & HOWARD M. VOLLMER, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL 
JUSTICE 229–33 (1969).  For a more recent examination of how internal processes can expand law’s 
reach, see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 464–65 (2001) (examining “the set of intermediate actors, operating within and 
across the boundaries of the workplace, that have emerged as important players in the implementation 
of workplace innovations to address bias.  These nongovernmental actors are simultaneously 
influencing judicial definitions of effective workplace problem solving and translating legal norms into 
organizational systems and standards.”). 
71 Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organization Governance: The Expansion of Due 
Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401, 1410 (1990). 
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within corporations.  Company employees in these positions attend 
conferences on the applicable law, write memoranda on the relevant issues 
which they distribute within firms, and generally increase firm awareness 
of the legal issues in question.  In formulating and overseeing the 
implementation of company policies, they affect internal business 
organizational culture, fostering company compliance with existing legal 
requirements and norms even where state enforcement is weak.72 
Business lawyers who defend their clients against advocates’ claims 
may aid advocates’ ends in creating legal compliance procedures to avoid 
legal challenge.  Even if the risk of restrictions is minute, in-house lawyers 
can benefit if their clients come to them for legal analysis and take that 
analysis into account.  In-house counsel has an interest in being respected 
for its legal knowledge within the firm’s hierarchy.  When consulted by the 
firm’s business personnel, in-house counsel, together with employees from 
the firm’s human resources division, may (unintentionally) overstate the 
risks to an enterprise from non-compliance by focusing on a legal reading 
of the law (as opposed to the law-in-action), its substantive requirements 
and sanctions, including any draconian risks such as imprisonment of 
company executives.  Outside law firms and other consultants likewise 
distribute to clients and prospective clients memoranda, manuals, and other 
private assessments of the law in order to encourage firms to come to them 
for legal advice.  At symposia, they market contractual and other 
precautions, which can be drafted and implemented to reduce the risk of 
legal challenge.  In doing so, however, they may catalyze change in 
corporate practices, shaping the law-in-action. 
In the field of wrongful discharge law, for example, Edelman, 
Abraham, and Erlanger find: 
Employer’s in-house counsel may benefit from increased 
demands for their services within the firm and, like personnel 
professionals, may attain power by helping to curb the 
perceived threat of wrongful discharge lawsuits. . . . The 
threat of wrongful discharge, then, may [also] help practicing 
lawyers [of outside firms] in the field of employment law 
expand the market for their services.73 
They conclude that “the personnel profession, with some help from the 
legal profession, has constructed the law in a way that significantly 
overstates the threat it poses to employers.”74  Ironically, in providing legal 
counsel to their clients on the law’s provisions and risks, in-house and 
                                                                                                                          
72 Frank Dobbin & John R. Sutton, The Strength of a Weak State: The Rights Revolution and the 
Rise of Human Resources Management Divisions, 104 AM. J. SOC. 441, 443 (1998). 
73 Lauren B. Edelman, Steven E. Abraham & Howard S. Erlanger, Professional Construction of 
Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 75 (1992). 
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external business lawyers and internal human resource employees can 
become unconscious abettors of the aims of otherwise underfunded and 
disparate rights advocates. 
Data privacy regulation provides another example of private law 
regimes that complement and parallel public ones.75  In the United States, 
private privacy seal programs are funded by business to adopt private 
privacy codes.  This is done in part to ward off public regulation by 
demonstrating that business self-regulation is sufficient.  Yet these private 
regimes also interact with public law regimes.  For example, if a business 
does not comply with the rules it advertizes, it is subject to challenge by 
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission for deceptive practices.76  Moreover, 
through the threat of data transfer restrictions and foreign litigation under 
EU law (the data privacy directive), the European Union helps raise the bar 
of what a U.S. business is willing to sign.  Existing public law, in this case 
domestic and foreign, stimulates business demand for privacy policies and 
independent certification of them, including reducing the prospect of new, 
and even more constraining, public law. 
Legal and other professionals serve as carriers and filters of law and 
can facilitate a convergence in business practice over time.  Business 
policies can become isomorphic in light of professionals’ interactions, and 
business’ desires to gain legitimacy through the adoption of what is 
perceived to be fair governance procedures.77  In this way, business 
internal policies can affect entire organizational fields through parallel 
adoption of policies by individual firms.  For example, internal U.S. 
business policies and procedures have been constructed parallel to civil 
rights laws78 and health and safety laws.79 
2.  Curtailing Law’s Reach 
The creation of internal business policies more than simply reflects and 
furthers law’s reach.  In creating organizational policies and procedures, 
business has an incentive to interpret public law requirements to suit 
business interests in ways designed to limit regulation’s constraints.  Law’s 
textual ambiguities facilitate business’s opportunity to do so.  In 
internalizing public law, business translates and transforms it.  Corporate 
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internal policies and administrative procedures, for example, mimic central 
legal principles of due process, but do so by displacing the intervention of 
public legal authorities.  Adopting internal rules allows the organization to 
“symbolize compliance” and borrow the legitimacy accorded to public law, 
while exercising greater control of its implementation and, in the process, 
its meaning.80 
Business can attempt to preempt public law by removing disputes from 
external controls, such as by including mandatory arbitration provisions in 
business contracts.81  Businesses have long created dispute settlement 
institutions to resolve conflicts between them.  Lex mercatoria, for 
example, was enforced by specialized merchant courts at trade fairs in the 
Middle Ages.82  In contemporary international transactions, businesses still 
seek to avoid the biases and complexities of conflicts of law by avoiding 
adjudication before public courts.  National legal systems recognize and 
enforce these private arbitration rulings.83 
These mechanisms are also increasingly deployed in entirely national 
settings.  The U.S. Federal Arbitration Act, for example, curtails U.S. 
states’ ability to limit the use and enforceability of arbitration provisions in 
business contracts with consumers.84  The rise of the alternative dispute 
resolution (“ADR”) movement in the United States and abroad generally 
facilitates businesses’ ability to resolve disputes outside the public 
domain.85 
The rise of in-house counsel can also contribute to the internalization 
of law by business in ways similar to how public law influences business 
strategies.  Since the 1970s, the number and status of in-house counsel has 
grown dramatically.86  The use of in-house counsel involves lawyers in 
                                                                                                                          
80 Edelman & Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court, supra note 61, at 961. 
81 Id. at 963. 
82 See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 46; see generally Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. 
North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, 
Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990). 
83 See Laure Leservoisier & Clifford Chance, Enforcing Arbitration Awards and Important 
Conventions, in THE ARBITRATION PROCESS: COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS 255, 256 (Dennis Campbell & S. Meek eds., 2002) (“One of the main advantages of 
international arbitration over litigation in national courts is that, due to the existence of a number of 
international conventions on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, foreign arbitral 
awards are, in principle, readily enforceable in many countries.”). 
84 State attempts to protect consumers from mandatory arbitration “have been rendered 
substantially irrelevant by [a] series of Supreme Court decisions . . . .”  EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. 
SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT 158 (2006). 
85 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of 
“Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 843, 911 (2004) (“Confronted with 
increasingly daunting litigation costs and perceived great risks, the great majority of major businesses 
were led to experiment with ADR.  In recent years, mediation has become a more and more popular 
alternative.”). 
86 See Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global 
Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1059 (1997) (“Between 1970 
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strategic planning at an earlier stage of transactions.87  In-house counsel 
manage businesses’ internalization of legal regimes as part of 
programmatic prevention policies.88  In the process, in-house counsel can 
give law more of a business orientation since in-house counsel can blend 
both legal and business advice more than outside legal counsel, blurring 
the distinction between doing law and doing business.89 
By symbolically incorporating public requirements into internal 
corporate policies, by internalizing administrative control over its routine 
activities through complaint procedures, and by preempting external 
intervention through private alternative dispute resolution, business can 
create its own legal field which helps to legitimize business practices.  
While Galanter earlier explored the ability of repeat players to exploit the 
judicial process, internalizing the legislative and judicial processes 
circumvents the public law system.  In a reflection piece twenty-five years 
after his article speculating “why the haves come out ahead,” Galanter 
found that corporate internalization policies represent a “recoil against 
law” in response to reduced leeway afforded to business by the public law 
system.90  Internalization policies remove issues from public rule making 
and adjudication.  By usurping the role of external legal processes and 
supplanting them with internal rules, large organizations can enhance their 
ability to limit legal change.91  Under these internal systems, the “haves” 
                                                                                                                          
and 1980, there was a forty percent increase in the number of lawyers working in-house; and between 
1980 and 1991, there was a thirty-three percent increase.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or To Buy: 
In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J. CORP. L. 497, 498 (2008) (“Improvements in reputation 
and skill of in-house lawyers and the recent growth of in-house legal departments mark a watershed in 
legal demographics.  Although a need remains for outside law firms, especially in litigation, the relative 
distribution of work has changed.  There has been a substantial shift towards more in-house lawyer 
transactional work in the past decade, with one survey showing approximately 68% of transactions 
currently lawyered in-house.”). 
87 See Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 277, 281 (1985) (“The very existence of a properly established inside counsel pushes 
back the involvement of lawyers to an earlier phase of a transaction and shifts the mode from reactive 
to proactive.”). 
88 See id. (“Only in the last five years has it become systematic, structured, and formally 
articulated into milestones with formal documentation.”). 
89 See Robert Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the 
Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW &  SOC’Y REV. 457, 464 (2000) (“Yet the 
counsel role implies a broader relationship with business actors that affords counsel an opportunity to 
make suggestions based on business, ethical, and situational concerns.”); Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside 
Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 487 
(1989) (“Inside counsel can use the information, organizational power, and trust they obtain from being 
part of the client organization to participate in corporate planning, anticipating legal problems and 
maintaining legal compliance.”). 
90 Galanter, Farther Along, supra note 51, at 1116. 
91 See Edelman & Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court, supra note 61, at 944 (“Although 
‘have not’ groups may gain some short-run advantages from the introduction of legal norms into the 
workplace, we contend that the organizational annexation of law subtly skews the balance between 
democratic and bureaucratic tendencies in society as a whole, potentially adding to the power and 
control of dominant elites.”). 
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are arguably even more advantaged.92 
IV.  DYNAMIC INTERACTION: PUBLIC LAW IN THE                                
SHADOW OF BUSINESS PRACTICE 
Rather than being viewed as distinct, public law and business internal 
policies are interpenetrated, reciprocally and dynamically affecting each 
other.  On the private side, private legal systems do not exist in a vacuum.  
Even in domains where publicly-made law does not exist and business 
creates its own private standards, business does so in the shadow of the 
public law system’s potential intervention.  First, the public legal system 
provides default rules that apply where private standards and contracts are 
incomplete.93  Second, as behavioral economists note, default rules 
significantly affect behavior, whether because people consciously avoid 
the transactional costs of negotiating around them, blindly follow a path of 
least resistance, or are socialized to accept them as normal.94  Third, public 
law can catalyze more transparent and principled decision-making within 
decentralized, private “new governance” processes that fall outside of 
traditional conceptions of law.95  These new governance processes operate 
in the shadow of the public law system. 
On the public side, public legal systems likewise can be viewed 
(reciprocally) as operating in the shadow of business practice.  First, 
legislators can respond to private regimes by codifying them, and courts 
can do so by enforcing them as exemplars of business custom or 
                                                                                                                          
92 Id. 
93 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 
(1989) (“Default rules fill the gaps in incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract 
around them.”); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 
VA. L. REV. 821, 822 (1992) (“Much of what is taught as the law of contract can be conceived as 
publicly provided ‘background’ rules or principles that fill the inevitable gaps in the private law made 
by contracting parties.”); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of 
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 489–90 (1989) (“These doctrines, which serve to define the exact 
scope of contractual obligations, are often referred to as ‘background rules’ or ‘default rules,’ although 
the term ‘default rules’ more commonly refers only to those rules which the parties are free to vary by 
appropriate language in their contract.”); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for 
Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 599 (1990) (noting that default rules provide a gap 
filling function in contracts). 
94 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83–87 (2008) (discussing how most people will choose whatever 
option requires the least amount of effort); see also Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in 
Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1583, 1586 (1998) (“Parties are likely to favor default terms . . . because [such] terms are often 
correlated with inaction . . . .”). 
95 See Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New 
Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 566 (2007) (“Courts’ gate-keeping function places the 
judiciary in a position to shape the practice of legitimacy and accountability within new governance 
institutions.”); Sturm, supra note 70, at 562 (noting how courts can create general norms and incentives 
which encourage employers to develop processes which comply with such norms). 
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responsible business practice.  For example, after the New York Stock 
Exchange required corporations with listed securities to adopt Audit Board 
Committees, non-listed companies also adopted them out of concern that 
courts might now consider the practice to be a standard for responsible 
conduct when adjudicating lawsuits against corporate directors.96  Second, 
when business responds to new public regulation through adopting internal 
policies and practices, business may reciprocally shape the understanding 
of existing law within public institutions, including courts.97  Thus, while 
legal interpretation and enforcement affect economic behavior, 
organizational behavior, in turn, affects public law.  The two, public and 
private legal ordering, dynamically interact. 
To give an example, national courts have long enforced contracts 
based on customary business practices.  As John Braithwaite and Peter 
Drahos write, “the common law absorbed and adapted the Law 
Merchant,”98 such as private business regimes pertaining to bills of 
exchange, promissory notes, and letters of credit.  “[S]pecialist commercial 
courts . . . in England bound themselves to the principle of recognizing the 
customary practices of merchants, which in turn helped to produce and 
reinforce the Law Merchant.”99  In civil law countries, this customary 
private law was codified in the commercial codes of Western Europe.100  In 
the United States, codification took place through the model Uniform 
Commercial Code which was subsequently adopted in all U.S. states but 
one.101  These codes and institutional practices then spread to other parts of 
the world through colonialization and a general modeling of Western 
commercial law.102  However, as discussed in Part V below, when these 
national public courts began to reach conflicting judgments in their 
applications of the new codes, business responded with new transnational 
                                                                                                                          
96 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 171. 
97 See infra notes 98–103.  From the perspective of social theory, one can distinguish the concept 
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL AUTOPOIESIS 80 (Jiri Priban & David Nelken eds., 2001). 
98 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 49. 
99 Id. at 65. 
100 Moreover, in France, the lowest-level court for commercial matters, the Tribunal de 
Commerce, is composed of lay members from the business community.  Many German Länder have 
created special chambers for commercial matters that include lay judges.  Jurgen Basedow, The State’s 
Private Law and the Economy—Commercial Law as an Amalgam of Public and Private Rule-Making, 
56 AM. J. COMP. L. 703, 707–08 (2008). 
101 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 50. 
102 Id. at 49–50. 
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private harmonization initiatives.103  In other words, public and private 
ordering processes in commercial law have dynamically responded to each 
other over time. 
Particularly important for our analysis, internal business policies and 
procedures can shape how public law is perceived, transforming its 
meaning.  They can do so both in terms of social practice regarding the 
“law,” and in terms of formal legal interpretation by courts and 
administrative bodies.  To start with social processes, business practices 
under internal organizational policies and procedures can affect what 
individuals perceive to be the law, shaping their “legal consciousness.”  As 
seen in Part III, corporate compliance officers share their policies and 
procedures in symposia, workshops, electronic list-serves, trade journals, 
and other fora, leading to similar institutionalized practices in a field. 
Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita show how managerial discretion in 
applying civil rights laws has transformed the way that the public views the 
scope and application of civil rights laws.104  In their study of business 
“diversity” policies, they find that, “as legal ideas move into managerial 
and organizational arenas, law tends to become ‘managerialized,’ or 
progressively infused with managerial values.”105  They find that 
managerial discretion in implementing civil rights laws within 
organizations reframe diversity issues to include not only gender and race, 
but also issues of personality and cultural lifestyle traits, transforming the 
legal ideals underlying civil rights law.  These internal business laws and 
practices can colonize public law by “redefining what is seen as ‘normal,’ 
‘reasonable,’ ‘rational,’ and ‘compliant’” in terms of internal business 
grievance procedures created in response to public law.106 
Turning to legal institutions, business internal policies and practices 
can affect courts’ interpretation and application of public law.  In the civil 
rights field, internal business grievance procedures are not required by the 
laws themselves, yet they can shape courts’ understandings of these laws.  
Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger find, in their study of internal business 
practices applying the civil rights laws, that professionals “promote a 
particular compliance strategy, organizations adopt this strategy to reduce 
costs and symbolize compliance, and courts adjust judicial constructions of 
fairness to include these emerging organizational practices.”107  The study 
finds that “courts have become more likely to defer to organizations’ 
grievance procedures and to consider them relevant to determinations of 
                                                                                                                          
103 See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
104 Lauren B. Edelman, Sally Riggs Fuller & Iona Mara-Drita, Diversity Rhetoric and the 
Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1591, 1601 (2001). 
105 Id. at 1599. 
106 Edelman & Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court, supra note 61, at 963. 
107 Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity of Legal 
Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 408, 445–47 (1999). 
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liability.”108  As Edelman and Suchman state, courts “often defer to the 
results of internal hearings” and “dismiss claims of any plaintiffs who have 
failed to exhaust their in-house remedies.”109  Judges in overstretched and 
underfunded public law systems have incentives to do so.110  In sum, public 
law is often defined in the shadow of business practice, acquiring meaning 
and having effects through internal business policies and procedures. 
V.  BUSINESS AND LAW IN GLOBAL AND COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 
Legal rules, norms, and institutions have diffused globally through 
processes of colonization, economic exchange, and the growth of 
international and transnational institutions.  This transnational diffusion of 
law interacts dynamically with national and local legal cultures so that we 
cannot fully understand the relation of law and business within countries 
apart from transnational processes.  Yet there continues to be significant 
variation in outcomes at the national level despite transnational processes 
of convergence.111  This section integrates an evaluation of transnational 
lawmaking and its reception within countries into our analysis of the 
relation of business and law. 
A.  The Making of Transnational Law 
Businesses play a critical role in international and transnational law, 
which has spread, directly or indirectly, to most regulatory areas.112  
Businesses do so through using centralized and decentralized mechanisms.  
They can enlist powerful states to create international public law that 
advances their interests.  They can independently create transnational 
private legal orders.  And they can export their internal standards globally 
through decentralized processes of diffusion.  In their study of thirteen 
areas of global business regulation, Braithwaite and Drahos found that 
business actors play leading roles.  They found, in particular, that “state 
regulation follows industry self-regulatory practice more than the reverse . 
. . .”113  In some cases, international standards simply formalize and 
legitimize informal practices of large dominant businesses.114  Where 
                                                                                                                          
108 Id. at 409. 
109 Edelman & Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court, supra note 61, at 965. 
110 See NEIL KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF 
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111 See, e.g., David Nelken, Culture, Legal, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: 
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113 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 481. 
114 Id. at 492. 
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harmonization occurs, it is easiest to base it on dominant business practices 
in a field. 
Private transnational legal orders and national public law systems 
interact.  Private parties have long engaged in private transnational rule-
making to facilitate cross-border transactions.  These transnational private 
norms are often codified by states into national law.  When conflict-of-law 
issues arise between different national variants, business has responded by 
trying to re-harmonize the law at the international level through new 
private ordering initiatives, giving rise to a “new Law Merchant.”115 
Among international business organizations, the International Chamber 
of Commerce (“ICC”) stands apart as the premier coordinating body on 
behalf of business interests to create transnational privately-made law.116  
The field of international trade finance exemplifies the ICC’s lawmaking 
role.  The ICC’s goal, as Janet Levit writes, is to codify “international 
banking practices, as well as to facilitate and standardize developing 
practices” for letters of credit used in international trade.117  The ICC has 
written a set of rules known as the Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credit (“UCP”) to govern transnational letters of credit.  The 
ICC clarifies the interpretation of these rules through issuing hundreds of 
“advisory ‘opinions.’”118  In this way, the ICC attempts to resolve 
ambiguities regarding the application of the UCP in different contexts.  
Most banks today will not issue letters-of-credit unless they are subject to 
UCP rules.119  When exporters and importers identify the UCP as their 
choice of law, national courts enforce them.120  Levit finds that national 
courts do so “even in the face of a domestic statute designed for related 
issues,” demonstrating the UCP’s broader normative impact in national 
judicial practice.121  Similarly, the ICC periodically revises “Incoterms” 
which define and interpret sales terms used in the shipment of goods,122 
and which guide national courts hearing contractual disputes.123 
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International private lawmaking by business has particularly evolved 
in the area of technical standard setting.124  Within the European Union, the 
Comité Européen de Normalisation (“CEN”) and Comité Européen de 
Normalisation Electrotechnique (“CENELEC”) are the two main bodies 
for the creation of “voluntary” European standards in which the private 
sector plays a central role.  These standards are not internally binding on 
the European member states, but they have become de facto harmonized 
requirements for selling products within the European Union because of 
their importance in the marketplace.125  At the international level, business 
works through the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”), 
a Geneva-based non-governmental organization which is the world’s 
largest producer of international standards, and in which the private sector 
again plays a central role.126  European business interests are sometimes 
favored within ISO because of their prior organization through CEN and 
CENELEC.127  Market forces again press businesses to apply these 
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voluntary ISO standards.  National courts can impose tort liability if they 
fail to do so and someone is harmed.128 
Business also can enroll state representatives to advance business goals 
in the creation of international law.  They can do so in the negotiation of 
private international law treaties, like the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of 
Lading.  They can also do so in the elaboration of “soft law” norms, such 
as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and 
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law.  A common form 
of regulatory export occurs where national industry associations shape the 
law in a dominant state, and this law becomes the model for other states, 
including through the enactment of international treaties and international 
soft law guidelines.  While such influence varies by industry and country, 
Braithwaite and Drahos found that U.S. corporations exert more power in 
the world system than corporations of other states because they can enroll 
the support of the world’s most powerful state.129 
Private business also enlists states to advance its interests through 
public international law litigation.  Corporations frequently lie behind the 
claims that state representatives bring in international trade litigation.  
They lobby state representatives, provide them with requisite background 
factual information, and hire outside lawyers to help write the legal briefs.  
As a result, most litigation before the dispute settlement system of the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) involves the formation of partnerships 
between state representatives, private business interests, and the lawyers 
that businesses hire.130 
Finally, business can bypass states and directly lobby international 
organizations.  The ICC again plays a central role, as it lobbies the full 
spectrum of UN organizations.  It looks “for key loci of decision-making in 
the globe and builds a poultice of influence around them” in order to 
influence international publicly-made law.131  The ICC has been central to 
international commercial law,132 tax law,133 telecommunications and e-
commerce law,134 and the drafting of environmental treaties.135 
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Public international law, of course, can also be used against businesses.  
Non-business actors can deploy public international law to challenge 
business conduct before national courts, exemplifying again how 
international and national institutions interact.  Human rights activists have 
repeatedly brought suits under international law before U.S. courts to 
challenge business conduct in third countries, such as mining in Indonesia, 
oil exploration in Burma and Nigeria, and aiding and abetting the apartheid 
regime in South Africa.136  The resulting national legal decisions, in turn, 
become evidence of customary international law.137  These legal 
challenges, in turn, spur business efforts to curtail them through new 
transnational private legal ordering mechanisms138 and lobbying for new 
national legislation.139  But while there is a great deal of legal scholarship 
focusing on international human rights claims against corporations before 
U.S. courts, transnational business law is in fact much more commonly 
deployed before national courts, both in the United States and abroad. 
In sum, public international law, transnational private legal ordering, 
national public law, and business practice dynamically and reciprocally 
interact over time.  They increasingly do so as international and 
transnational public and private legal ordering processes proliferate, which 
in turn affect legal systems and the relation of business and law at the 
national level. 
B.  The Reception of Transnational Law 
Transnational lawmaking does not uniformly affect national legal 
regimes.  Legal change instead varies as a function of the configuration of 
domestic interests in a regulatory area, domestic institutional structures, the 
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role of elites, traditions of business-government relations, and differences 
in legal and business culture.  Legal culture refers to the attitudes and 
behavior that people have and exhibit toward law and legal institutions 
within a domestic system—or, as Lawrence Friedman writes, the patterns 
of “when, why and where people look for help to law or to other 
institutions, or just decide to ‘lump it.’”140  Business culture refers to the 
patterns of norms and behavior of people and institutions in the business 
world, and in particular (for our purposes) their relation to law and state 
institutions.141  Although it would be myopic to reduce all behavior to 
expressions of interest, one must also be careful not to reify or essentialize 
culture, since both interests and cultural norms are channeled by 
institutional structures which reflect political choices.142  A full picture of 
how transnational lawmaking is mediated in national legal regimes must 
account for the interaction of these different factors. 
Domestic systems receive international law differentially, in part as a 
function of domestic patterns of business-government relations.  For 
example, Robert Kagan’s work depicts how business-government relations 
in the United States are characterized by “adversarial legalism,” which he 
defines as “policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution 
by means of lawyer-dominated litigation.”143  Kagan finds that both 
cultural and institutional factors give rise to adversarial legalism in the 
United States.  He maintains that (culturally) U.S. attitudes that 
governmental power should be constrained and that persons (including 
corporations) should invoke the law to protect their rights and achieve their 
goals further an adversarial legal culture.144  He likewise contends that 
(institutionally) “adversarial legalism arises from the relative absence of 
[U.S.] institutions that effectively channel contending parties and groups 
into less expensive and more efficient ways of resolving disputes, ensuring 
accountability, regulating business, and compensating victims of injury or 
economic misfortune.”145  In such a context, business is more vigilant 
regarding the domestic application of international law, unless 
international law reflects U.S. law or business practice. 
Within Europe, there continues to be considerable variation among 
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legal systems, despite the harmonizing aims of the European Union.146  In a 
famous article from the 1970s, Dietrich Rueschemeyer maintained that 
attitudes toward law in Germany are affected by more authoritarian 
traditions of rule “by an enlightened and supposedly neutral 
bureaucracy.”147  He contended that lawyers within the German bar 
retained a greater “reserve toward the world of business.”148  Regarding 
France, Kenneth Dyson found that “state-industry relations remain notably 
intertwined,” reflected in “the prevalence of members of the élite grand 
corps in the top management positions of the public and private sectors,” 
giving rise to “a web of patronage spanning the public-private sector 
divide.”149  Laurent Cohen-Tanugi likewise contended that French society 
is “sensitive to the power relations underlying a given legal framework,”150 
which leads to a “quasi-exclusive attention to power, whether political or 
economic, rather than to law, which is seen as either mere window-
dressing or simply the result of the power relations.”151  He argued that the 
French thus manifest “a fair amount of tolerance for failure to respect the 
rule of law.”152 
Some scholars contend that the U.S. model of adversarial legalism is 
being exported globally, and in particular to Europe.153  The place of law is 
certainly changing in European countries in reflection of global 
competition, economic restructuring, the rise of the European Union, and 
citizen demands.154  Yet, these changes, including a relative rise in the role 
                                                                                                                          
146 See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law 
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MODERN L. REV. 11, 11–32 (1998) (discussing the effect of European 
Union policy directives in European social, legal, and philosophical contexts). 
147 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Lawyers and Their Society, reprinted in EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES 
83 (Volkmar Gessner, Armin Hoeland & Csaba Varga eds., 1996). 
148 Id. at 278. 
149 Kenneth Dyson, Cultural Issues and the Single European Market: Barriers to Trade and 
Shifting Attitudes, 64 POL. Q. 84, 93 (1993), reprinted in EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES 387, 395 
(Volkmar Gessner, Armin Hoeland & Csaba Varga eds., 1996). 
150 Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, The Law without the State, reprinted in EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES 
269, 270 (Volkmar Gessner, Armin Hoeland & Csaba Varga eds., 1996). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Cf. generally Robert A. Kagan, Globalization and Legal Change: The “Americanization” of 
European Law?, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 99 (2007) (discussing the ways in which American legal 
culture has influenced European nations, while also explaining important differences between them); R. 
Daniel Keleman, Suing for Europe: Adversarial Legalism and European Governance, 39 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 101 (2006) (providing a conceptual framework for understanding the integration and 
consequences of “adversarial legalism” in the European Union); David Levi-Faur, The Political 
Economy of Legal Globalization: Juridification, Adversarial Legalism, and Responsive Regulation, 59 
INT’L ORG. 451 (2005) (offering a critical analysis of theses exploring the globalization of the 
American legal culture and providing a model for interdisciplinary study of global legal and regulatory 
change). 
154 For excellent studies of developments in consumer law in Europe, see Fabrizio Cafaggi & 
Hans W-Michlitz, Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law: A Framework for Comparative 
Assessment, 16 EUR. REV. OF PRIVATE L. 391, 421 (2008) (“Clearly, the differences [between the U.S. 
and Europe] in the role of consumer protection associated with market structures, firm sizes, the role of 
the administrative state, and that of private organizations remain significant.  However, the degree of 
 
 2009] HOW BUSINESS SHAPES LAW 179 
of courts and legal processes, take place in the context of institutional path 
dependencies and different legacies of government-business relations.155 
Turning to Asian nations, it is often stated that people are more 
reluctant to use formal legal processes than in Western nations, especially 
the United States, and thus there is less adversarial legalism.  Japan, for 
example, has much lower litigation rates compared to the United States.  
This difference has sparked debate among those stressing Japanese cultural 
and institutional factors which affect the formal invocation of law.156  More 
recently, the focus on cultural explanations, such as the importance of 
“social harmony” and “social consensus” in Asia, has sparked charges of 
Orientalism.157  Scholars today often stress institutional factors in Asia, and 
how political choices determine the availability of institutions for dispute 
settlement, which can change in response to new political demands.158  For 
example, Thomas Ginsburg and Glenn Hoetker show how litigation rates 
have risen in Japan in response to structural reforms and institutional 
changes, including relaxed controls over the licensing of lawyers.159 
Scholars also stress variation in Asian legal systems, including in light 
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of contemporary pressures leading to changes in the role of law and courts.  
Rapid economic development, followed by the bursting of the Japanese 
economic bubble and the 1997 Asian financial crisis, has significantly 
affected the role of law for business.  China has moved dynamically 
toward a market economy, and has developed “new structures and 
processes for resolving disputes,” and, in particular, commercial ones.160  
In India, where courts are plagued by a large backlog of cases, frequent 
adjournments and long delays, companies have increasingly sought to 
resolve legal disputes through alternative dispute resolution processes, 
including arbitration.  Yet these processes also have given rise to delay, 
backlog, and frustration, spurring new reform efforts.161  In many less 
developed Asian countries, courts and formal law have not held as 
prominent a position, in part because these countries have other political 
and economic priorities, and in part because of the impact of corruption 
and authoritarian rule.162  Yet these systems also change in light of 
transnational pressures mediated through domestic institutional patterns of 
governance. 
The diffusion of transnational corporate bankruptcy law exemplifies 
both how transnational law matters within domestic legal systems and how 
it is differentially received.  Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers have 
done path-breaking field work at the international and national levels in 
this area.163  From this work, they have developed the following theory: 
[G]lobalization of law can be expressed through a complex 
set of three cycles: (1) at the national level through recursive 
cycles of lawmaking and law implementation, (2) at the 
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global level through iterative cycles of norm making, and (3) 
at an intersection of the two where national experiences 
influence global norm making and global norms constrain 
national lawmaking, in an asymmetric but mutual fashion.164 
They show how bankruptcy law prescribed at the international level is 
resisted at the local level, in particular by corporate debtors, resulting in 
failed reforms.  They find that strategies at the international level change in 
response to national implementation challenges.  In the bankruptcy law 
context, the locus of international reform efforts has shifted among 
international institutions, from the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), 
the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, to the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (“UNCITRAL”).  Developing countries consider UNCITRAL to be 
more “legitimate” because it is part of the United Nations system and they 
are better represented within it.  For this reason, Halliday and Carruthers 
find that UNCITRAL is potentially more effective.  These institutions 
bring together not only representatives from states and international 
institutions, but also interested professionals, such as bankruptcy lawyers 
and accountants, diffusing the norms of a transnational epistemic 
community of practitioners.165 
Halliday and Carruthers examine the different types of mechanisms 
used to diffuse international bankruptcy norms within Asian states.  
Coercive measures (such as IMF loan conditionality) have been more 
effective in Indonesia than in Korea and China.  International institutions 
also had greater leverage over Korea than China during the Asian financial 
crisis, but Korea was more likely to require persuasion to adopt legal 
change than was Indonesia.  In contrast, change was most likely to occur in 
China through Chinese modeling of reforms based on others’ practices and 
experiences.  In each case, national legal change occurred in light of 
transnational developments.  Yet the impacts varied in light of the 
transnational mechanisms used, which in turn reflected the country’s 
position of relative power in relation to international institutions and other 
states.166 
Halliday and Carruthers also show how the reception of international 
harmonization efforts is affected by different interests and institutional 
legacies at the national level.  They find that the reception of transnational 
bankruptcy law reform is affected by the fact that different actors (and, in 
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particular, different business interests) participate in struggles over national 
implementation than in international lawmaking.167  These domestic actors 
can block the effectiveness of bankruptcy reform efforts, including by 
taking advantage of the indeterminacy of international law and internal 
contradictions within it that reflect compromises made during its 
negotiation.  In the case of Indonesia, even though Indonesia was in a weak 
position in relation to the IMF, the bankruptcy reform efforts that 
Indonesia enacted were often thwarted in practice because of the resistance 
of powerful Indonesian business interests.168  Change in bankruptcy law in 
all three countries occurred dynamically in response to transnational 
processes, but the actual law-in-action continues to diverge in reflection of 
different articulations of business interests, national institutions, and legal 
traditions, as well as the relative susceptibility of the state to transnational 
pressures. 
In an era of economic and cultural globalization, even when law is 
harmonized at the international level, the impact varies significantly.  
Transnational lawmaking acts as an “irritant” within domestic systems.169  
It provides new tools of leverage for domestic actors who desire reform, 
potentially unsettling traditional political, business, and legal practices.  
Yet different national institutional structures and cultural norms mediate 
international law’s reception, producing variations in each country.  
Although business can exercise considerable influence in international and 
transnational lawmaking, which can, in turn, feed back into national law, 
the results continue to vary at the national level in light of national legal 
and business cultures, institutional structures and configurations of 
domestic interests.  National law is not static, and it responds to 
transnational lawmaking initiatives, but it continues to diverge in light of 
the interaction of transnational legal orders with disparate domestic legal 
systems. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Business and law have a complex relationship.  They operate, in part, 
autonomously from each other, and, in part, in response to one another.  To 
understand the relation of business and law, one must assess business 
influence on the formation and application of publicly-made law through 
legislatures, administrative bodies and courts.  One must also examine 
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business’s creation and application of private legal systems, whether to 
preempt public law, exit from public law, or internalize and, in the process, 
translate and transform public law.  One then needs to assess the dynamic 
and reciprocal interaction of these public and private legal systems in 
different national and transnational contexts.  Although public and private 
lawmaking for most regulatory fields has spread to the international level, 
its domestic implementation varies considerably in light of ongoing 
differences in the relative power of business, government and law at the 
domestic level, as well as differences in local institutional structures and 
business and legal cultures. 
Overall, the relationship of business and law is best viewed in terms of 
three sets of institutional interactions: the interaction among public 
institutions (legislative, administrative, and judicial), in each of which 
business plays a critical role; the interaction of national and transnational 
legal processes, with transnational processes having become more 
prominent in an economically and culturally interconnected age; and the 
interaction among these public lawmaking processes and parallel private 
rulemaking, administrative and dispute settlement institutions and 
mechanisms that business creates.  It is these dynamic, reciprocal 
interactions that constitute the legal field in which business operates. 
